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Dynasty Trusts: Another View
-by Neil E. Harl*  
 An article published in a recent issue of an agricultural publication  about “dynasty 
trusts” merits a response. While such trusts may offer some attractive short-term features, 
the probable long-term consequences are sobering. Indeed, from both a policy perspective 
and from the standpoint of the best long-term interests of generations to come, it has been 
the conclusion of this author that setting up such a trust would likely produce enormously 
disadvantageous	results	if	widely	used.	Indeed,	it	is	difficult	to	conceive	of	a	plan	that	would	
be more disadvantageous to future generations. 
 Here are the arguments supporting that conclusion.
The Rule Against Perpetuities
 The concept of “dynasty trusts” that can last forever is dependent upon repeal of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities which has been a part of the common law heritage for more than three 
centuries. The Rule, as it is commonly known, had its origins in the Duke of Norfolk’s case 
in the late 17th Century.1 The case involved disagreements among the heirs of the Duke of 
Norfolk over the propriety of leaving property in successive life estates. The court believed 
that it was wrong to tie up property beyond the lives of persons living at the time the property 
was conveyed, although the exact period for which such transfers should be permitted was 
not determined until roughly 150 years later.2 
 As followed at common law (and the statutory versions that followed the common law) 
in the United States, the Rule established a limit on holding property in trust or otherwise 
precluding property from vesting, measured by a class of lives in being plus 21 years.3 That 
usually has permitted the life of a trust to last for 100 years, but usually not more than about 
120 years. About half of the states adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities 
(USRAP) under which an interest in property was valid if it would necessarily vest or fail 
within lives in being plus 21 years (basically the common law rule) or the property actually 
vested within 90 years of creation.4 
 However, commencing about 30 years ago, a trend developed of repealing the Rule and 
about half the states have done so.5
Number of beneficiaries
  The problems associated with so-called “dynasty” trusts are principally long-term in 
nature	and	involve	significant	policy	issues.	First,	the	trusts	are	irrevocable		–	they	generally	
cannot be revoked or amended. Most think in terms of a couple of generations. But let’s fast 
forward to the year 2511, 500 years from now. These trusts are set up to last forever.  Not 
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maximized if resources are fully subject to the forces and pressures 
of the market and are routed to where the economic return is the 
greatest. 
The Administration’s Position
 The current Administration (principally originating in the 
Department of the Treasury) in February of 2011 published the 
“green book”8 which outlined a proposal to limit the duration 
of perpetual or “dynastic” trusts to a maximum of 90 years at 
which time the exemption of generation skipping would expire. 
Technically, the generation skipping tax exclusion allocated to the 
trust would terminate on the 90th anniversary of the creation of 
the trust.9	That	seems	to	be	sufficiently	long	to	accommodate	the	
usual objectives of trustors other than to create a perpetual trust.
The key question
 Do we want to place our economic system in jeopardy with such 
a short-sighted move as to see a substantial share of the country’s 
wealth tied up in trust forever? Individuals emigrating to this 
country a century or two ago did so in large measure because of 
the promise of economic opportunity. The risks to our system of 
property	rights	and	access	to	assets	is	too	precious	to	sacrifice	at	the	
altar of rescuing banks and trust companies from the competition 
emanating from the 20 or so states that have been foolish enough 
to repeal the Rule Against Perpetuities. That rule was formulated 
in the 17th Century to prevent land from being tied up forever.
 As legal philosophers have opined, “let’s not let the dead hand 
of the past control the present.” The author of that quote, Professor 
Lewis Simes, an esteemed legal philosopher, stated, in articulating 
two reasons for limits on how long property should be able to be 
tied up in trust (or otherwise), “First, the Rule Against Perpetuities 
strikes a fair balance between the desires of members of the 
present generation, and similar desires of succeeding generations, 
to do what they wish with the property which they enjoy. . . In a 
sense, this is a policy of alienability, but it is not alienability for 
productivity. It is alienability to enable people to do what they 
please at death with the property they enjoy during life. . . . But, 
in my opinion, a second and even more important reason for the 
[Rule Against Perpetuities] is this. It is socially desirable that the 
wealth of the world be controlled by living members and not by 
the dead.”10
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just 500 years or 1,000 years but forever. What started out in 2011 
as a couple with two children would, with normal fertility levels, 
have	 increased	 to	3.4	million	beneficiaries	 in	500	years.6 After 
only 150 years, the trust would be expected to have around 2500 
beneficiaries.7	The	beneficiaries	would		by	then	be	likely	to	view	
their interest in the trust much as the way the Social Security Trust 
Fund	is	viewed	today	–	very	distant	and	with	virtually	no	influence	
over the trust or its investments. It would fundamentally alter the 
way	individuals	and	family	view	property	–	as	some	distant	and	
largely unresponsive fund. Getting agreement to amend the trust 
would be almost impossible. 
Beneficiaries still farming?
 Although certainly not limited to owning farmland, for those 
owning farmland the view of many who have set up such trusts 
is that successors within the  family will continue to farm the 
land (or at least to own the land as landlords). Is that a realistic 
assumption?  We don’t know what technology lies ahead but just 
in the past 80 years the number of farmers has dwindled sharply. 
It seems a safe bet that the future will see more of the same. There 
is no assurance in 500 years that any of the successors within the 
family would have the remotest interest in farming. 
 Would the land in question even be used for farming in 500 
years? Or would it be covered over with concrete and blacktop as 
a city? Or a huge regional airport? Would the family successors 
who might be interested in farming be working in the shadow of 
a skyscraper? 
 Past generations have been able to assess their interests and 
abilities and strike out in areas hardly dreamed of by their parents, 
taking their share of the family wealth with them and under their 
control. 
What about access to assets?
 Just ponder for a moment what the  chances of acquiring land (or 
other assets) today would be if the wealthy in 1011 had frozen all of 
the land in trust? It has been an article of faith in this country that 
if one works hard, saves their money, some day they can acquire 
property. That would be substantially curbed if dynasty trusts were 
to become widespread. 
Who would be in control of the land? 
 Most dynasty trusts are set up with a bank or trust company 
as trustee. That might  involve trust administration in places 
like Cedar Rapids or Peoria or even Indianapolis. But the way 
banking is changing and consolidating, the trust might end up 
being administered in Beijing or Singapore or some other distant 
place.
 It would place enormous economic power in the hands of the 
corporate trustees with little accountability. There is no secret 
why banks and trust companies have been the big advocates for 
dynasty trusts. That whistling sound overhead is money and other 
assets on the way to South Dakota,  Alaska and the other states that 
have repealed the Rule.  Moreover, the fees charged are largely 
unregulated. 
Reduced economic growth
 It is well known that corporate trustees tend to be cautious 
and conservative, not wanting to be “surcharged” for mistakes in 
judgment in handling a trust. With the trust assets largely shielded 
from market forces, widespread ownership of assets in such trusts 
would almost certainly reduce the rate of economic growth in the 
country. It is an article of economic faith that economic growth is 
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